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State Constitutional Law Steps Out of the 
Shadows: Transcript of Selected Symposium 
Panel Discussions* 
I. SCHOOL FINANCE AND EDUCATION RIGHTS PANEL DISCUSSION 
Stephen Mazza, Interim Dean, University of Kansas School of Law: 
Good morning, everyone.  Welcome to the Kansas Law Review 
Annual Symposium.  I am Steve Mazza, the Interim Dean at the KU Law 
School.  We are honored to have with us today distinguished members of 
the judiciary of the legal academy and of the practicing bar.  The topic of 
today’s symposium, State Constitutional Laws Steps Out of the Shadows, 
was suggested by our own Professor Stephen McAllister who is widely 
known for his work as the Kansas Solicitor General and his involvement 
in several important state constitutional cases.  Steve, working with the 
Law Review Symposium Editor, Joseph Hinckley, the Law Review 
Editor in Chief, Melissa Plunkett, and the Managing Editor, Daniel 
Buller, and the entire Law Review staff, has put together an outstanding 
program and what I think you will find to be an interesting approach to 
today’s event.  Instead of following the typical model of having a single 
presenter followed by a question and answer session, the program 
organizers opted to employ discussion panels, each having a convener 
and a group of panelists.  As a result, I expect we are going to get a much 
livelier discussion of the issues this morning.  So without further ado, I 
want to thank all the panel participants and I will turn the program over 
to the Symposium Editor of the Kansas Law Review, Joseph Hinckley, 
who will introduce the panels.  Thank you. 
 
Joseph Hinckley, Symposium Editor, Kansas Law Review: 
Thank you, Dean Mazza.  We are grateful for Dean Mazza’s support 
of the Law Review.  He has been a long-time faculty advisor to the Law 
Review, and we are especially grateful for his help in organizing this  
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Questions from the audience have been omitted. 
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symposium.  I echo his thanks to Professor McAllister and his co-authors 
who have really provided the catalyst for this symposium today. 
Today, it is my pleasure to introduce the convener of our first panel, 
Judge Jeffrey Sutton.  Judge Sutton sits on the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit.  He has served on the Sixth Circuit since 2003.  Prior to 
this, he practiced in the Columbus, Ohio office of Jones, Day, Reavis & 
Pogue.  Judge Sutton served as a law clerk to Judge Thomas Meskill, 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.  He also clerked for Justice 
Powell and Justice Scalia of the United States Supreme Court.  He served 
as the State Solicitor of Ohio from 1995 to 1998. 
 
Hon. Jeffrey S. Sutton, United States Circuit Judge, Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals: 
 Thank you so much and thank you to the Law Review and the Law 
School for hosting this terrific event.  I have the honor of convening our 
first panel on school funding.   
We have three terrific panelists.  Professor Jeffrey Shaman is a 
Professor of Law at DePaul University.  He is the former President of the 
ACLU of Illinois, and he had two notable publications that caught my 
eye.  The first was an early 1970s article saying that we should abolish 
bar examinations.  I did not manage to read all of the article but there 
may be a few students interested in what his point was and whether you 
can get any traction with it at this stage.  The other publication is that 
he’s a co-author of the state constitutional law textbook that he, Justice 
Holland, Professor McAllister, and I wrote.1  Our second panelist is 
Justice Mark Martin, the most Senior Associate Justice on the North 
Carolina Supreme Court.  He became a judge at age twenty-nine and was 
the youngest judge elected to the State Court of Appeals in North 
Carolina history and the youngest Justice elected to the North Carolina 
Supreme Court in North Carolina history.  Our third panelist is Professor 
Sanford Levinson, Professor of Law at the University of Texas, and he 
holds a chair in the Political Science Department there as well.  He also 
teaches at Harvard and formerly taught at Princeton.  He has written four 
books and 250 articles.   
Each panelist is going to speak briefly about school funding 
litigation and state constitutionalism.  I will follow up with some 
questions and lead a discussion among the four of us, and then I’ll leave 
at least fifteen to twenty minutes for questions from the audience.   
                                                     
 1. RANDY J. HOLLAND, STEPHEN R. MCALLISTER, JEFFREY M. SHAMAN & JEFFREY S. 
SUTTON, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE MODERN EXPERIENCE (2010). 
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Professor Shaman will go first, and I will introduce his remarks by 
mentioning perhaps the most famous case in U.S. Supreme Court history 
and certainly the most famous school case in U.S. Supreme Court 
history.  That, of course, is Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka.2  It 
also happens to be a case with Kansas connections.  The defendant, 
Topeka Board of Education, was located in Kansas, the Brown family 
was from Kansas, and the lawyer who defended the state in the case, 
Paul Wilson, was a former professor of law at the University of Kansas 
who wrote a book about his efforts defending the Topeka Board of 
Education called, appropriately enough, A Time to Lose, which indeed he 
did.  Brown says education is perhaps the most important function of 
state and local governments.  That proposition might be one of the few 
things you could get all Republicans and all Democrats in this country to 
agree is still true. 
Brown held that this public service “must be made available to all on 
equal terms.”  Brown eliminated one problem for equality.  It removed 
racial barriers to an equal education, but at the same time it left in place 
the risk that there will be wealth-based barriers to an equal education.  
Brown eliminated de jure racial segregation but left in place de facto 
wealth-based segregation—economic stratification in every state in the 
country between wealthy suburban schools, relatively poor rural 
community schools, and relatively poor urban city schools.  Seventeen 
years after Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court had a chance to correct that 
problem, the wealth-based problem.  That case is Rodriguez v. San 
Antonio School District, 3 and I’m going to let Professor Shaman tell you 
what happened. 
 
Jeffrey M. Shaman, Vincent de Paul Professor of Law, DePaul 
University College of Law: 
First of all, thank you Judge Sutton for revealing how old I am and 
reminding me of the article from so long ago that I had completely 
forgotten about it.  Aside from that, I wanted to talk a bit about two 
cases: Serrano v. Priest 4 and San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez.  In 1971, the Supreme Court of California decided a case 
entitled Serrano v. Priest.  This represented a new era in state 
constitutional law; an era characterized by the rediscovery of state 
constitutional rights.  Serrano presented an equal protection challenge to 
                                                     
 2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1953). 
 3. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 4. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971). 
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the California system of financing public schools.  Based heavily on 
local property taxes, the California system resulted in a wide disparity of 
funding from one school district to another.  Under the California 
system, poor districts had little to spend on education while wealthier 
districts had considerably more. 
After reviewing the system, the California Supreme Court concluded 
that the system of financing public schooling violated both the federal 
and state equal protection clauses.  In so ruling, the California court 
found that education was a fundamental right entitled to enhanced 
constitutional protection.  The court stated unequivocally that it was 
“convinced that the distinctive and priceless function of education in our 
society warrants, indeed compels, our treating it as a ‘fundamental 
interest.’”5  Nothing could be more irrational, the court continued, then to 
have the quality of children’s education determined by the value of their 
parents’ and neighbors’ property.  So that was Serrano v. Priest decided 
in 1971. 
Two years after Serrano, the United States Supreme Court decided 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez which also 
presented an equal protection challenge, this one under the Federal 
Constitution, to the Texas system of financing public schools.  Like the 
California system struck down in Serrano, the Texas system was based 
heavily on local property taxes and resulted in substantial disparity of 
funding from one school district to another.  In fact, in Texas, even 
though the poor districts taxed themselves at a higher rate than the 
wealthier districts, the poor districts ended up having less to spend on 
education, very little to spend on education, while the rich districts taxing 
themselves at a lower rate had considerably more. 
Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the 
Texas school funding system did not violate the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Federal Constitution.  In reaching that conclusion, the high court 
ruled in Rodriguez that under the Federal Constitution the right to an 
education is not a fundamental right and, therefore, was entitled to only 
the most minimal constitutional protection.  The Court ruled that 
education was not a fundamental right because, as the Court said, it was 
not explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.  In the Court’s 
view, no matter how important a right might be, it would not be accepted 
as a fundamental right unless it could be tied to the text of the 
Constitution itself. 
                                                     
 5. Id. at 1258. 
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It should be pointed out that this marked a momentous shift in the 
Court’s thinking.  In a number of previous decisions, the court was quite 
willing to recognize fundamental rights even though they could not be 
tied to the text of the Constitution.  For example, nothing in the 
Constitution guarantees the right to marry, the right to procreate, the 
right to vote in a state election, or the right to appeal from a criminal 
conviction; yet the court had recognized all of these as fundamental 
rights and, therefore, entitled to enhanced constitutional protection. 
In Rodriguez, though, the court was unwilling to further expand the 
concept of fundamental rights.  The Supreme Court’s unwillingness in 
Rodriguez to recognize education as a fundamental right was, I think, 
grounded in notions of federalism and a reluctance to intrude upon state 
sovereignty.  While federalism concerns are always present in a case 
asking a federal court to strike down state legislation, the Supreme Court 
noted in Rodriguez that it would be difficult to imagine a case having a 
greater potential impact on the federal system than this one in which the 
court was urged to abrogate systems of financing public education that 
were in existence in virtually every state.  In other words, for the 
Supreme Court to find an equal protection violation in Rodriguez would 
cast doubt upon the educational systems in virtually every state of the 
Union.  The Supreme Court’s concerns about federalism in the case led it 
to back away from any sort of critical oversight of the state educational 
systems.  A majority of the court thought that anything other than 
extremely deferential review would be too much federal intermeddling 
with state prerogatives. 
After the Supreme Court ruling in Rodriguez, various state and 
county officials in California went back to the California Supreme Court 
and asked it to overturn its ruling in Serrano on the ground that it had 
been countermanded by Rodriguez.  The California Supreme Court 
declined to do so, noting that its previous decision had been founded on 
the equal protection clause of the California Constitution as well as the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution.6  The California 
court explained that while Rodriguez, of course, overruled that part of the 
California court’s decision based on the Federal Equal Protection Clause, 
Rodriguez had no effect whatsoever upon that part of the court’s decision 
based upon the California equal protection clause, which the California 
Supreme Court reaffirmed. 
The decision of the California Supreme Court in Serrano II stands as 
a dramatic manifestation of the independence of state constitutional law 
                                                     
 6. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1977). 
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from federal constitutional law.  The court in Serrano II declared that its 
main concern was with California law and the full panoply of rights 
Californians have come to expect as they are due.  While decisions of the 
U.S. Supreme Court are entitled to respect, they will not be followed by 
the California courts when the protection they afford is less than the 
protection guaranteed by California law.  So in Serrano II, the California 
Supreme Court concluded on its own that education was a fundamental 
right, the school finance system amounted to a suspect classification on 
the basis of wealth, strict judicial scrutiny should be used, and under 
strict scrutiny, the school finance system was unconstitutional. 
It is important to note, that in sharp contrast to a federal case such as 
Rodriguez, in a state case such as Serrano where a state educational 
financing system is challenged under a state constitutional provision, 
there are no federalism concerns.  Not only is the state court free from 
federal doctrine about the meaning of constitutional provisions, but in 
addition to that, the state court is also free from concerns about 
overstepping the prerogative of some other sovereign.  A state court 
might have concerns about separation of powers so it might decide to 
defer to the state legislature about a particular matter, but those are 
concerns about the allocation of authority among the various branches of 
state governments and are not concerns about federalism.  As the 
California Supreme Court explained in Serrano II, while the constraints 
of federalism are necessary to the proper functioning of the federal 
courts, they simply are not applicable to a state court in determining 
whether its own state system of financing education runs afoul of a state 
constitution. 
It has been almost forty years since Serrano I was decided, and by 
now, something like forty-five states have litigated school funding cases 
under their state constitutions; in perhaps two-thirds of them the courts 
have found constitutional violations.  Although it still remains to be seen 
to what extent these rulings have actually changed the system of funding 
of schools in each state, I am sure we are going to be talking a bit more 
about that as the panel progresses. 
 
Hon. Mark Martin, Senior Associate Justice, North Carolina Supreme 
Court: 
Good morning.  When Judge Sutton reminded me of how young I 
was when I became an appellate judge, I just had to sit there and think, 
“Well, I don’t feel quite as young as I used to.” 
It is an honor to be here with you this morning.  What I would like to 
do in my brief introductory remarks is focus on two key questions that I 
have confronted in the school litigation in my state.  The first key 
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question: How is the right to education characterized in the text of the 
state constitution and in the decisional law?  Secondly, what standard of 
review is applied by the courts?  With these key questions in mind, I will 
spend my time providing a case study of educational rights under the 
state constitution as interpreted by the [North Carolina] Supreme Court.  
First, I will give you a brief background on the educational provisions of 
the state constitution, and then I’ll discuss three relevant cases—
Leandro,7 Hoke County,8 and King.9 
Article I, the Declaration of Rights section of the [North Carolina] 
Constitution, section 15, states that “the people have a right to the 
privilege of education and it is the duty of the state to guard and maintain 
that right.”10  Article IX of the constitution, in fact, is all about 
education.11  The article requires the legislative branch to establish a 
general and uniform system of free public schools, provides for school 
funding generally, establishes a state board of education and defines its 
powers and duties, and includes provisions regarding higher education, 
the University of North Carolina system, and requires the legislative 
branch to maintain a public system of higher education.  Most notably 
from article IX is section 2, which provides that the legislature shall 
provide, by taxation or otherwise, for a general and uniform system of 
free public schools wherein equal opportunity shall be provided for all 
students. 
In Leandro v. State,12 a decision from 1997, plaintiffs from poor 
school districts essentially challenged the funding scheme.  The parties 
sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that they had a 
constitutional right to adequate educational opportunities that was 
essentially being denied by funding disparities.  At issue was whether the 
state constitution included a qualitative component to public education—
in other words, in the court’s words, whether that education meets some 
minimum standard of quality. 
The court, in fact, declared that education was a fundamental right, 
which put us in a plurality of jurisdictions that came to that conclusion.  
And I quote the court: “We conclude that at the time this provision was 
originally written in 1868 providing for a ‘general and uniform’ system 
but without the equal opportunities clause, the intent of the framers was 
                                                     
 7. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997). 
 8. Hoke Cnty Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365 (N.C. 2004). 
 9. King v. Beaufort Cnty Bd. of Educ., 693 S.E.2d 655 (N.C. 2010). 
 10. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15. 
 11. N.C. CONST. art. IX. 
 12. 488 S.E.2d 249. 
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that every child have a fundamental right to a sound basic 
education . . . .”13  Of course, the implication of the court’s holding was 
that the court directed that, if on remand, based on the trial court’s 
finding, that in application of strict scrutiny, the defendants would have 
to establish that their actions and their effectuation of financing was 
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.  It was 
interesting in the Leandro decision that the court actually defines what a 
sound, basic education represented.  I do not have time to go into that 
now, but it was interesting that the court set out four general categories 
of components of education that public schools should be fulfilling. 
Now this all could be contrasted, as Professor Shaman indicated, 
with the decision in Rodriguez in which the U.S. Supreme Court did not 
find education to be a fundamental right and thereby applied a low level 
of scrutiny, which we are all familiar with—rational basis review.  Our 
decision also contrasted with the Massachusetts decisions in school 
funding wherein Massachusetts courts found a violation but did not base 
it upon education being characterized as a fundamental right, and, in fact, 
in a 1995 decision, Doe v. Superintendent of Schools of Worcester, 
indicated: 
While the court acknowledged in McDuffy the importance of 
education and decided that the Commonwealth generally has an 
obligation to educate its children, the court did not hold, and we 
decline to hold today, that a student’s right to an education is a 
‘fundamental right’ which would trigger strict scrutiny analysis . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . Instead, we join the courts of several other jurisdictions in 
holding that education is not a fundamental right.14 
Back to North Carolina and two other court decisions, which I will 
just briefly touch on due to time limitations.  Hoke County Board of 
Education v. State in 2004 involved the Leandro litigation coming back 
to the state’s highest court after essentially seven years on remand, and 
you could imagine the complexity of this litigation and the amount of 
resources that went into it.  Essentially, the trial judge, in addition to 
finding that the funding scheme was a constitutional violation, declared a 
right for at-risk students to essentially a mandatory educational scheme.  
                                                     
 13. Id. at 255. 
 14. 653 N.E.2d 1088,1095 & n.4 (Mass. 1995). 
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What was interesting is when the case came back to the [North Carolina] 
Supreme Court in which the trial court had held that at-risk four-year-
olds were entitled to education, the Supreme Court reversed that part of 
the remedial order.  In light of appropriate deference to the legislative 
and executive branches in formulation of education and policy, the court 
declared that the trial court had gone too far in its assessment. 
Now let me conclude briefly with our most recent decision in 
education law, King v. Beaufort County Board of Education.15  What I 
want you to be thinking about is how the characterization of the 
fundamental right was handled in this most recent foray into educational 
law.  The facts of King are straightforward.  A student is given a long-
term suspension for essentially engaging in a fistfight.  She is suspended 
for the rest of the school year and no alternative education is provided to 
the plaintiff and she is not told why.  On appeal to the [North Carolina] 
Supreme Court, the issue is this: Did the student have a right flowing 
from Leandro’s characterization of education as a fundamental right to 
alternative education?  The majority held that there was no state 
constitutional right to alternative education.  The rights there were solely 
statutory in nature.  Nevertheless, because of the state constitutional 
provisions that guarantee equal access to all students, the student was 
entitled to know the reason for her exclusion from alternative education. 
In closing, the constitutional right became very interesting in this 
litigation.  I was not on the court at the time of Leandro, which was 
decided in 1997, but I noticed that the characterization of education as a 
fundamental right brought it directly in conflict with another line of cases 
that apply rational basis review to school disciplinary determinations.  So 
the court somehow had to harmonize its previous characterization as 
education being a fundamental right, at least for purposes of school 
funding litigation, with the realities of school discipline and the needs of 
local school administrators to provide a safe environment for students. 
Looking at the entire experience, it leaves you with a few thoughts 
that Professor Shaman touched on earlier.  Even though federalism is not 
a concern, separation of powers clearly is a concern.  Although you have 
checks and balances on the state level, there is an interesting relationship 
with the legislative branch, which essentially authorizes appropriations 
for the funding of the judicial branch.  At remedial stages of educational 
litigation, many times the state courts are actually ordering the legislative 
branch to increase appropriations to public education, which can really  
                                                     
 15. King v. Beaufort Cnty Bd. of Educ., 693 S.E.2d 655 (N.C. 2010). 
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create some conflict between branches.  I look forward to further 
discussion. 
 
Sanford Levinson, W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood, Jr. 
Centennial Chair, Professor of Government, University of Texas School 
of Law: 
I am especially grateful to be here because in some ways I am here 
under false pretense.  I really do not know much about state 
constitutional law.  It is a new interest of mine.  For me, this is like being 
a kid in a candy store and the opportunity to come here and be 
surrounded with people who are immersed in the topic was too good to 
turn down.  It is also the case that if I bring any comparative advantage at 
all—since I have already declared that it is not comparative advantage of 
lawyerly knowledge—it would be wearing my other hat as a political 
scientist.  So I will try to make some brief remarks about one of the 
simple paradoxes in the area of school finance.  What might help to 
explain why many state courts have been so innovative in school finance 
litigation, given how different most state judiciaries are from their 
federal counterparts.  That is, they must commonly face the electorate, 
whether when attempting to join the bench or in retentions elections.  
There is, therefore, far more electoral accountability, for good and for ill, 
than at the federal level.  . 
I presume at some point today, either at one of the sessions or private 
conversations, there will be some discussion of the fact that three judges 
were fired last week in Iowa in what seems clearly to be direct 
retribution for their votes in a same-sex marriage case.  Judge Sutton has 
life tenure, which means forever; except for Rhode Island, all states have 
age limits on service.   Discussants of federal courts, particularly the 
Supreme Court, tend to obsess—I think far too much—on the so-called 
countermajoritarian difficulty.  There have, however, been some very 
interesting articles written about state courts that suggest the problem is 
not the countermajoritarian difficulty but the majoritarian difficulty.  
Why is it that we would ever expect state courts to be particularly 
sensitive to protecting the rights of politically unpopular groups when, 
presumably, there are voters available to chastise judges who reach out to 
defend the highly vulnerable and unpopular?  So there is a paradox 
presented.  The [U.S.] Supreme Court in Rodriguez, rightly or wrongly, 
rejected the opportunity to stand up on behalf of highly vulnerable 
children of parents of very modest means who clearly would not be 
protected by the state political systems and state courts stepped into the 
breach.  So how does one explain that? 
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I draw a possible explanation from the work of my friend, Mark 
Graber, a political scientist/lawyer from the University of Maryland, who 
suggests—and he is writing primarily about federal courts, but I think the 
argument holds for state courts as well—that courts are often invited to 
decide certain hot-potato issues that, for a variety of reasons, the ordinary 
political system is reluctant to decide. 
So to take the most dramatic example: the Dred Scott16 case, the 
most notorious case perhaps in our entire history.  Mark’s view is that the 
Congress of the United States and the President of the United States were 
just delighted with the prospect that the U.S. Supreme Court would try to 
cut the Gordian knot because, for a variety of reasons which aren’t worth 
going in to, it was obvious that the political system of the United States 
broke down.  And it was simply hopeless to expect Congress to resolve 
this issue.  Now Dred Scott is not a notable success, but the argument 
that Mark makes is that you cannot blame the Supreme Court for trying 
because, in part, the political system had broken down and there was no 
reason whatsoever to think that it would have functioned better than the 
U.S. Supreme Court did, even if you could see that Dred Scott was 
disastrous in all sorts of respects. 
Fast forward to school finance and it seems to me that one way of 
understanding these cases—as a hypothesis rather than a strongly 
asserted argument—is that the legislature, for a variety of reasons, was 
either unwilling or unable to step into what was widely recognized to be 
a problem, and analysts of the problem could take one of two quite 
different paths.  One is to emphasize the problem of unequal funding, as 
Judge Sutton already mentioned, and the kinds of issue you might get 
into if you contrast some kids getting $3000 a year and other kids getting 
$8000 or $10,000 or whatever-thousand dollars a year. 
Then there is a different sort of inquiry, where somebody talking 
about adequate education might look around and say, “Look, if some 
school system wants to spend $10,000 and build Olympic-sized 
swimming pools, who really cares?  The real problem of our education 
system is that there are lots of kids who are not getting anything that 
could be described as adequate level of education and something needs 
to be done about that.”  This directs the inquiry away from equal finance 
into trying to figure out what some sort of baseline level of an adequate 
education might look like.  The question is this: Would legislators move 
on their own in doing this?  There might be a variety of reasons to think  
                                                     
 16. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
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the answer is no and that they would appreciate the intervention of courts 
to jog the system along. 
Then, as a political scientist, I noticed some other interesting aspects 
about state courts in contrast to federal courts.  One of the notable 
realities, for example, of the U.S. Supreme Court right now is that not a 
single Justice has ever run for public office.  Nobody has been elected to 
anything.  Justice Thomas administered a moderately important federal 
agency; and Justice Breyer worked on Capitol Hill; and Justice Kagan 
served both in the Clinton White House and as Solicitor General.  But 
running even for dog catcher is not part of the resume of any member of 
the United States Supreme Court.  This contrasts to lots of previous 
courts, the most notable example being the court that decided Brown v. 
Board of Education.  Chief Justice Earl Warren was the former Governor 
of California and a candidate for Vice President of the United States in 
1948; there were three former senators on the Court.  It was a very 
different Court—an unimaginably different Court—from what we have 
today. 
There are also profound differences in the frequency with which 
various courts actually engage with certain issues.  Look at New Jersey 
where there have been twenty-six or twenty-eight school finance cases.  
Again, that is an interesting difference between at least the U.S. Supreme 
Court and state courts.  The U.S. Supreme Court every now and then will 
decide a decision on a topic and then very often just forget about it for 
years.  So some of us, for example, are interested in the issue of 
affirmative action in higher education.  There are two decisions.  One 
decided in 197817 and then literally twenty-five years later they got 
around to deciding the completely incoherent dyad dealing with the 
University of Michigan undergraduate program and the University of 
Michigan Law School.18  The one thing you can say with confidence is 
that seven of the nine Justices of the Supreme Court believe that the split 
decision makes no sense, but because Justices Breyer and O’Connor 
managed to see a distinction, we are left with a totally confusing so-
called doctrine, and the Supreme Court hasn’t returned to it.  Whereas, as 
I said, there have been twenty-six or twenty-eight school finance 
decisions in New Jersey.  So there is far more of a dialogue among the 
state courts than the federal courts in this sort of issue. 
I am also interested in who the state-court judges were.  The Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey during a very key period 
                                                     
 17. University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 18. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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was former Governor Richard Hughes, a very savvy person.  A relevant 
Justice in Texas when the Edgewood19 case was decided there was Oscar 
Mauzy, a very active and activist Democrat who became sufficiently 
frustrated by the inability to get relevant legislation in the Texas 
legislature that he ran for the Texas Supreme Court and found the votes 
on the Texas Supreme Court to change the baseline of argument.  The 
fact is, to an astonishing degree, the baseline was changed and stuck, 
even though the Texas Supreme Court is now completely Republican and 
the politics in the state certainly moved to the right.  But it is still the 
case that Edgewood lives out of place. 
The hypothesis I have is that members of state supreme courts are 
likely to be more politically savvy than members of the federal courts. 
Electing judges certainly has its problems—but we should not blind 
ourselves to certain merits as well in election systems.  (There is no 
perfect system, obviously.)  If you have to run for office, you pick up a 
sense of what the public wants and will bear.  If you also come out of a 
political process, if you have been a governor like Richard Hughes or if 
you had been an elected Attorney General like the Chief Justice of the 
Kentucky Supreme Court when that court declared unconstitutional the 
state’s public school system, then you may well be skilled in reading 
political tea leaves.  As noted, the Kentucky Supreme Court declared 
unconstitutional every aspect of the existing Kentucky public school 
system because it did not provide a minimally adequate education.20  
This was in response to litigation generated by a citizens group headed 
by a former governor frustrated by the inability of the legislature and 
governor to move forward.  What is interesting in Kentucky is that, 
unlike New Jersey where you had twenty-six or twenty-eight subsequent 
decisions going back and forth, in Kentucky you have only one because 
dynamiting the system with the support of lots and lots of political 
leaders was enough to change the political game in Kentucky.  There was 
subsequent agreement on tax increases, different forms of funding; most 
people that are interested in education think that the court really made a 
difference. 
Now the last hypothesis I have—and it is one of the reasons I am so 
glad to be here, because I am extremely interested in your own response 
to this hypothesis—is that people who run for state courts have a desire 
to do something.  They are take-charge sorts of people.  This does not 
mean they run amok because there are ways, obviously, of reining in 
                                                     
 19. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). 
 20. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (1989). 
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people who want to do too much too quickly, but nonetheless there is a 
desire to make a mark and a certain sophistication that the mark, if it is 
going to be made, has to be made in a certain kind of dialogue with other 
political figures within the political system as well as ultimately with the 
public at large. 
As a political scientist, one of the reasons I have become interested 
in state constitutional law is the radical differences between the very 
organization of the federal judiciary and the state judiciary, and some of 
these radical differences might help to explain why it is that state courts 
have been far, far more interesting and involved with the issue of school 
finance than the federal courts.  Quite frankly, putting aside theoretical 
arguments about whether Rodriguez was right in rejecting education as a 
fundamental right, which I think is the dubious part of Rodriguez, why 
would we really want federal judges or members of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, given their likely experience (or lack of political experience), to 
monitor the nations’ systems of school finance, with all of the delicate 
political implications that are involved? Why would we not prefer the 




Let me pick up where Professor Levinson left off and put this 
discussion back into the context of Rodriguez. 
One very crude way to think about individual liberties and equal 
protection litigation at the constitutional law level is about battles 
between the powerful and powerless.  It is hard to think of anything more 
important as a matter of policy than providing children access to an equal 
education relative to other children in a state.  In Rodriguez, the court 
had a chance to do just that and did not.  In the next forty years or so, 
however, the state supreme courts have filled the gap. 
What is interesting is not that they filled that gap.  What is 
interesting is that less has been done when it comes to other battles 
between the powerful and the powerless.  When people try to explain 
why that has happened, the conventional wisdom is that state supreme 
courts for the most part are interpreting constitutions that can be 
amended by a fifty-one percent vote.  So they really do not have a 
countermajoritarian component to them, and if you do something that is 
too controversial, that constitutional provision can be amended.  The 
other consideration is that people who interpret these documents for the 
most part, are accountable to the electorate at regular intervals through 
fifty-one percent votes.  So you have this process for selecting people 
that is majoritarian in nature with respect to a job that is at least 
KANSAS LAW REVIEW 2010 SYMPOSIUM TRANSCRIPT FINAL 5/14/2011  1:07:31 PM 
2011] STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SYMPOSIUM 911 
nonmajoritarian in nature and sometimes needs to be countermajoritarian 
in nature. 
So picking up on Professor Levinson’s point, why is it that the state 
courts were willing to do this?  Professor Shaman and Justice Martin, do 
you have any reactions to what Professor Levinson said as to why in this 
one conspicuous area the state courts have filled the breach? 
 
Professor Shaman: 
Well, I’m not sure that I have any good answers, but I do think that 
Professor Levinson has identified some characteristics about state judges 
that I think will probably prove to be correct when you finish researching 
your hypothesis.  I agree with where you are going. 
I want to suggest a few other reasons why state judges might jump 
in.  The first one is I think because many state judges just might have 
disagreed with the Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez and many 
state judges might have thought it was blatantly wrong to rule that 
education was not a fundamental right.  I would note that in Serrano I the 
California Supreme Court, in finding that education was a fundamental 
right and that wealth was a suspect classification, relied upon a number 
of U.S. Supreme Court decisions and then was astounded when the U.S. 
Supreme Court said, “No, you got our decisions wrong.”  The California 
Supreme Court came back in Serrano II, and said, “No, we did not get 
your decisions wrong, and we are going to stick with the reasoning of 
those prior decisions.” 
Another thing I want to suggest is that in Rodriguez, the U.S. 
Supreme Court was dealing with this very general constitutional 
provision, the Equal Protection Clause.  It doesn’t say anything about 
education.  State constitutions do say things about education and 
sometimes some very specific things about education.  Justice Martin 
mentions that the North Carolina Constitution states that there shall be 
equal educational opportunity, a uniform education, and a number of 
state constitutions require that the legislature provide a uniform system 
of education.  Some state constitutions require the legislature to provide a 
high-quality education for all citizens in the state.  When you are a state 
judge, how can you ignore that kind of language in the state constitution? 
 
Judge Sutton: 
That’s a nice point.  Justice Martin, would you like to add anything 
at all? 
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Justice Martin: 
Well, it is really interesting.  When you think about Brown and its 
remedial touchtone of all deliberate speed, there is no question that until 
the time that the U.S. government—the political branches, legislative, 
executive branches—were fully behind the promise of Brown, very little 
progress was made.  I think if we looked at the state level in terms of 
educational funding, you mentioned, Judge Sutton, the reaction of the 
defendants to the outcome in your state; much the same in mine, and 
what it reminds me of is the remedial limitations of courts in many 
instances.  Our school financing decision went on for over a decade. 
Critics wonder, as Professor Levinson noted: “Did the fortunes of the 
school children materially improve?”  In other words, were they better 
able to read and write and do complex mathematics?  What we had in my 
state was similar to Ohio; even though education was characterized as a 
fundamental right, when the state court issued this order, the legislative 
leaders said, “Wait a minute, educational funding falls within our 
province and who are you to tell us how to fund education?”  So you 
have this situation over time where the trial judge is ordering that 
funding disparities be equalized and the legislative branch is saying, 
“Well, maybe we will get to that at some point.” 
 
Professor Levinson: 
A publication that I am inordinately pleased by was to have a letter 
to the editor in The New Yorker a couple of weeks ago.  It was a response 
to a short column written by Nicholas Lemann talking about the new 
movie that has recently come out—Waiting for Superman, written about 
education—and he had a sentence that stated the Constitution nowhere 
mentions education.  So I quickly sat down and wrote a letter pointing 
out that it is true only if you think of the U.S. Constitution, but every 
single state constitution mentions education one way or another. 
For me, this underscores the really terrible way that we teach 
something called American constitutional law in this country because 
everybody assumes that the only constitution in town is the U.S. 
Constitution.  That is false, and there are really notable differences 
between the national Constitution and all of the various state 
constitutions.  One of the clichés that I taught our students is that the 
U.S. Constitution does not have any real vision of positive rights.  But, as 
a matter of fact, every state constitution does have a vision of positive 
rights at some level, most dramatically with education but not only with 
education.  There are other state constitutions that have much more 
robust notions of welfare rights, but even very, very well-educated and  
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sophisticated people like Nick Lemann do not know that because we just 
do not teach it.  It is not part of the dialogue. 
I agree completely with Professor Shaman that if one is on a state 
court and you are given a patch of text that says, as in Massachusetts, one 
should cherish public education and the College in Cambridge in order to 
provide a citizenry that can enact the vision of a republican form of 
government, then you have to sit up and take notice.  There is no such 
language, obviously, in the U.S. Constitution, and so you have to argue 
using the Equal Protection Clause. 
 
Justice Martin: 
Let me make one other comment if I could, Judge Sutton.  If we have 
these remedial obstacles, where does that leave us in the federal courts, 
federalism concerns, state courts, and separation of powers concerns?  I 
would strongly argue that even when we have remedial obstacles, the 
aspirational value of these decisions are too much to be ignored.  Query 
whether the national government would have eventually fully supported 
equal rights for all children if the U.S. Supreme Court had not made its 
pronouncement.  In the same way, I think state supreme courts can very 
much fulfill that aspirational function of setting a standard, and so the 
public can plainly see that the courts have set a standard, and it really 
puts the other branches of government on notice with a greater degree of 
accountability.  So I think there is great value in these decisions. 
 
Judge Sutton: 
The way I might put it is I think there are some types of individual 
liberties—equal protection, for example—forms of litigation where it is 
really a majoritarian, countermajoritarian argument.  In other words, it 
may be that the majority of people elected to the state legislature chose 
not to do something but the will of the people is still to do it. 
So, for example, in the Ohio school funding case, there are 611 
school districts in Ohio and 500 or so supported the plaintiffs in the case.  
What did that mean?  The real battle is a populist battle.  The 100 
wealthiest school districts—suburban school districts—thought that they 
had a great system, and the only thing that is going to come out of this 
litigation is higher taxes.  So in that sense, at the school district level, it 
was majoritarian. 
That takes me to the next topic.  In Ohio today, the lowest spending 
school district spends about $5000 or maybe it is up to $6000 per student 
per year.  If you happen to live in a wealthy suburb, it is probably going 
to be $17,000 to $18,000.   
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If you grow up in Appalachia, southeastern Ohio, you are going to be 
at the $5000 to $6000 end.  If you happen to have the good fortune to 
have been born into a family in Upper Arlington or Bexley, you are 
going to be at the higher level.  If there is one thing most Americans 
think should be true in this country, it is that everyone should have an 
equal start in life—an equal opportunity to be what they want to be and 
to do something productive.   
So in all of these school funding cases, that has been one of the key 
missions of the plaintiffs—to try to close those gaps.  It has not 
happened.  While there has been a lot of success in raising the floor, I do 
not know of a state, whether it was through a legislature or a state court 
case, that has been able to meaningfully close the equity gap.  I am 
curious if any of the three of you think it is something that can be done or 




I think it is politically impossible to get close to perfect equality, to 
perfectly close the gap, but I think a lot can be done to reform the 
system.  Some of the systems are just so egregiously disparate that they 
cry out for reform.  I wanted to talk a little bit about the Texas system 
which, of course, was the subject of the Rodriguez case, and I think when 
Rodriguez was decided, the disparity between Alamo Heights and 
Edgewood was something like $567 per pupil per year versus about $300 
per pupil per year. 
 
Judge Sutton: 
I think it was even greater than that. 
 
Professor Shaman: 
After Rodriguez it had gotten much, much worse.  By 1989, when 
the Texas Supreme Court finally struck down the system in Texas, the 
wealthiest school district had over $14 million of property wealth per 
student while the poorest district had approximately $20,000 per student.  
That was a 700 to 1 ratio disparity.  The 300,000 students in the lowest 
wealth schools had less than 3% of the state’s property wealth to support 
their education while the 300,000 students in the highest wealth district 
had over twenty-five percent difference.  In Alamo Heights and 
Edgewood, the disparity had increased—Edgewood now had $38,854 in 
property taxes per student.  Alamo Heights—which by the way is in the 
very same county as Edgewood—had over $570,000 per pupil.  That is 
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just a disgrace, that kind of disparity.  The Texas Supreme Court struck 
that down.  I think someone was saying before, was it you Judge Sutton, 
that Alamo Heights and Edgewood today are pretty equal in funding? 
 
Judge Sutton: 
As of a couple of years ago, they are not just equal but the poorer 
district, Edgewood, is the one that has a little more.  Now, unfortunately, 
I think that might be a function of what is going on demographically in 
those two school districts.  I am pretty confident that if you go 
throughout Texas that you are going to find some very high-spending 
districts.  But it has improved. 
 
Professor Shaman: 
That is right and that illustrates, I think, that because of the politics 
of this, there is never going to be equality of funding.  But I think we can 
in many states or some states drastically improve the situation.  Kentucky 




The classic defense of judicial review is Alexander Hamilton’s 
Federalist No. 78.  If you read that carefully you discover that what he is 
concerned about is that if we ever do become a truly democratic 
system—and that is not number one of Hamilton’s priorities—then the 
majority of the have-nots will use their political power to redistribute and 
take from haves.  So the argument for strong judicial review is to protect 
property.  Hamilton is unapologetic and very candid about that. 
So what we are dealing with, as you point out, is the struggle 
between haves and have-nots; to the extent the have-nots are a majority 
then it is not surprising that most of the public schools systems in Ohio 
would be in favor of litigation that would have redistributive 
consequences, and therefore it is not surprising that those school systems 
in wealthy areas would be very upset.  In Texas, one of the responses to 
the supreme court decision there was to label it the Robin Hood case, but 
that has double meanings.  If you are part of the poor, then robbing the 
rich to give to the poor is not such a bad program. 
It has other overtones as well.  I do think, paradoxically or not, one 
of the things that might explain why state courts have been willing at 
least to bring this issue to the fore of public attention is because it does 
have majority support in class terms and then the really crucial issue is 
the remedy.  What you learn in the first year in law school is that it is not 
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that difficult to spin out theories of rights.  The real job of judging is to 
figure out the remedies and that is where the negotiations take place and 
that is why there have been two dozen cases in New Jersey or a dozen 
cases or so in Texas to try to figure out where the curves intersect as to 
some degree of redistribution that does not just seem to be too much 
where you would lose support.  You would throw the judges out; it is 
fascinating. 
Compare this to same-sex marriage in state constitutional law.  To 
my knowledge, there have been no attempts to amend education 
provisions in state constitutions, while there are scores of states that have 
passed amendments relating to same-sex marriage.  No attempt has been 
made to strip the state constitutions of any notion of a right to education. 
 
Judge Sutton: 
Think about how difficult that would be.  That is almost as difficult 
as taking away the right to vote for judges. 
 
Justice Martin: 
All I would add is that when you look at areas that courts have 
traditionally had authority and then you take a step over and look at the 
economic model about how schools are funded and the great reliance 
upon local property taxes, I do not think you can construct a way to make 
it more inequitable in terms of how schools are funded. 
 
Judge Sutton: 
I do not want to put you on the spot, Justice Martin, so if you do not 
want to answer this then I will try to answer it.  Could the supreme court 
just say, “Okay, listen.  Enough of this cat and mouse game.  There are 
two things that will solve these problems.  Thing one, get rid of the 
equity gap.  We are not having local school districts.  We are having a 
state system; there is a department of education and everyone gets the 
same amount of money.  There is no such thing as school districts.  
Everyone gets the same amount of money and that is what we are doing.  
Now if you don’t like that, you, the legislature, have a second option—
impose a $1 billion tax increase.  You get to pick.”  Could a state 
supreme court do that?  I am giving them options. 
 
Justice Martin: 
Going back to the economic model, courts have generally applied 
very low standards, minimal standards of review, for economic 
regulation and taxation, and that is viewed as a political branch function.  
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If you want to wave a magic wand and overlook the history and the 
evolution of how education has been financed in the country, I think on a 
normative level, we could come up with a lot of better solutions to it.  I 
think the real challenge for us is, since we cannot just eliminate entirely 
the history of it, how can courts be a partner in that dialogue to try to 
make the necessary improvements?  Clearly, if you had a true unified 
system where you had a state-level appropriation based upon the number 
of students in various school systems, you could equalize it very quickly. 
 
Professor Shaman: 
We could have something short of that.  Let the various districts 
retain their local school districts and have control over everything except 
funding and just have the state either take over the local property taxes or 
let the counties do it and then pay it all into state. 
 
Judge Sutton: 
In that model, would you prohibit the local school district from 
raising additional funding?  Let’s just say the parents decided: “The state 
is going to give us $6000 per student a year but we are going to create a 
local ‘education fund’ and it will be a private fund and over time it will 
have lots of money and we will supplement it by $1000 or $2000 per 
year.”  Would you allow that? 
 
Professor Shaman: 
I do not know if I would allow that.  That is a possibility.  I mean 
there are two variations of that model.  You could have the adequacy 
model where everybody is to pay everything into the state and then some 
school districts are allowed to raise some more, or you could disallow 
that and have complete equity.  But I think either of those systems would 
be a lot easier to administer and less threatening to the local school 
districts than saying, “We’re just going to have one state board of 
education and take everything over.” 
 
Judge Sutton: 
After the first Ohio Supreme Court decision, the legislature 
essentially said, “Okay.  The court has ruled.  One way to solve the 
problem is to raise X amount of money.  So we are going to do this; we 
are going to put an option on the next ballot to raise the sales tax by a 
penny, which would raise about a billion dollars a year.”  The proposal 
failed.  The court decisions had the support of the populace.  No one was 
trying to amend the constitution.  No one was throwing the Justices out.  
KANSAS LAW REVIEW 2010 SYMPOSIUM TRANSCRIPT FINAL 5/14/2011  1:07:31 PM 
918 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 




I would point out that, although you are absolutely right that these 
reforms have the support of the populace, they don’t have the support of 
the people who control the legislature and that is exactly what happened 
in my state of Illinois.  We had a coalition of school districts composed 
of Chicago and the inner-city schools and the down-state schools in the 
rural areas, which have very low funding, versus the wealthy suburban 
school districts around Chicago.  The legislature was just unwilling to 
change the situation. 
II. DUAL SOVEREIGNTY AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS PANEL 
DISCUSSION 
Stephen R. McAllister, Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of 
Law, Solicitor General of Kansas: 
Our final panel is on a topic that has been in play all day long, and 
before I get to the topic, I want to introduce the four panelists.  I think we 
have met all of them but one during the course of the symposium.  On 
the far end we have Judge Sutton who convened the School Finance 
Panel this morning.  Next to him is Chief Justice Rebecca Berch from 
Arizona, and she has not been on a panel yet today but has been looking 
forward to this panel.  She was a long-time faculty member at Arizona 
State University law school.  She has been Solicitor General of Arizona.  
She has served as a Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court for 
approximately eight years and is now that court’s Chief Justice.  She 
brings a wealth of experience in all sorts of ways with respect to state 
constitutional law.  Professor Michael Berch you met in the previous 
panel from the Arizona State University law school.  And then, 
Minnesota Justice David R. Stras who is quite an accomplished 
University of Kansas law graduate—one of my former students and I am 
very proud of what he has done. 
This is our group for this final discussion, which is titled Dual 
Sovereignty, and it probably seems like the least interesting of the four.  
What is particularly controversial or catchy about dual sovereignty?  I 
thought I would start with just a word about what we even mean by dual 
sovereignty.  I think what we mean is this system we have been talking 
about all day long.  Really, there are two levels of government.  There 
are more than that, but there are two major levels in the American 
KANSAS LAW REVIEW 2010 SYMPOSIUM TRANSCRIPT FINAL 5/14/2011  1:07:31 PM 
2011] STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SYMPOSIUM 919 
system—the federal government and the states.  We are focusing on the 
states, but the states only operate in the context of a greater, in some 
sense, overall national government.  In many ways, the topics we have 
discussed throughout the day implicate the relationships between these 
two sovereigns. 
The federal government, of course, is a government of enumerated 
powers under the U.S. Constitution; it is only supposed to have what it is 
given.  The states operate from the presumption that they have general 
police powers to do anything and everything.  So it would hardly be 
surprising, for example, that their constitutions cover all sorts of topics, 
some of which the federal government does not address and the Federal 
Constitution does not address. 
The state constitutions, both as an idea and in reality, actually 
predate the U.S. Constitution, going back to the Revolutionary War era.  
When the U.S. Constitution was adopted, it acknowledged the 
relationship with the states in ways that have continued to play out and 
evolve over time.  Some of the arguments you heard today were probably 
being made 200 years ago.  They may still be made 200 years from now 
in terms of what is the appropriate role for the states?  What is the 
appropriate role for the federal government?  What I want to do is just 
briefly touch on a fundamental theme of dual sovereignty. 
One point that is clear is if the federal government speaks and there 
is a question asking whether the U.S. Constitution allows something and 
the Supreme Court says it does not let the state do this or someone does 
have this right, what is very clear in our system is that the supremacy 
clause controls.  Federal law “wins” any conflict.  So a lot of the 
discussion here has surrounded the question: Can the state courts find 
additional rights or more expanded views of rights under their state 
constitution?  It tends to be a one-way street in that respect.  The states 
cannot say, “We want to give fewer rights than the U.S. Constitution 
protects.”  In theory they can say that, but it would be unenforceable.  
And in that sense, it is a one-way street, this concept of dual sovereignty.  
The supremacy clause makes that clear.  There are a lot of ways the two 
sovereigns interact.  I teach those in constitutional law, and I do not want 
to begin to get into all of that. 
What I thought we would do for this panel is begin with Professor 
Berch who has a few words to say, and then I think Chief Justice Berch 
wants to say a few words to him.  After that, we will go to some 
questions and further discussion. 
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Michael Berch, Alan A. Matheson Professor of Law, Sandra Day 
O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University: 
My interest in the subject of this symposium was sparked by the 
Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in Berger.21  In the previous panel 
discussion, I spent a considerable amount of time recounting the facts 
and relevance of that decision to the development of a coherent body of 
state constitutional law.  My essay that is included in the Law Review’s 
publication renders in greater detail my thoughts on the subject.  But for 
now, I should merely restate what is necessary for an understanding of 
this presentation.  Morton Berger was sentenced to a term of two 
hundred years—ten years for each count—for possession of twenty 
photographs of child pornography.  By statute each count has to be 
served consecutively, without the possibility of parole, pardon, or 
commutation.  This was the minimum sentence that could be imposed.  
Berger raised the issue of the federal and parallel state cruel and 
unusual punishment provisions but for some reason did not pursue the 
state claim before the Supreme Court.  
As a profession of law teachers, where did we go wrong?  I started to 
research the subject of raising state constitutional claims and was 
appalled to find so many examples where practitioners had failed to raise 
the issue in the lower courts or to pursue the claim before the appellate 
courts.  I noticed with grave misgiving that state courts were not 
excusing the waiver of the state constitutional issue.  After more soul 
searching, I came up with what I consider a modest proposal—for me it 
is modest—to change the adversarial structure, if you will, of our system, 
and I will spend a moment on what that structure would be.  I recognize 
that there are some disadvantages, but I also recognize a few salient 
advantages, not the least of which is the doing of justice. My 
accompanying essay develops these points in much greater detail. 
Briefly, the proposal encompasses the following approach: state 
supreme courts—and by that I mean the highest appellate courts—should 
more liberally note sua sponte issues of unraised state constitutional law 
in serious state criminal proceedings, where the issue may raise doubt, or 
the resolution may raise doubt, on the conviction or the severity of the 
sentence.  That is really what it comes down to.  So it does change the 
normally operative rule that if you do not raise a state constitutional 
question in the lower courts and preserve the issue throughout the 
appellate channels you (or should I say ) your client is out of luck.  I  
                                                     
 21. State v. Berger, 134 P.3d 378 (Ariz. 2006). 
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believe the courts should be more responsive to the needs of the justice 
system and adopt a more liberal attitude to excusing the waiver. 
I understand that this should not ordinarily be imposed as a judicial 
duty.  This is not something that will be a violation of federal 
constitutional rights if it is a state constitutional right that has not been 
raised.  I understand these things.  On the other hand, it would present a 
monumental attitude change to our judicial system.  To me, it is 
important that we are not just here as an umpire calling balls and strikes.  
We are here to do justice, especially when it involves a state constitution 
that governs the entire polity and not just the litigants.  This is not only a 
binary dispute.   
Now, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia comes right out 
and says that they will not resolve an issue not adequately briefed or 
argued, and that this is the premise of our adversary system.  But I think 
we have to do a couple of things before we just hook, line, and sinker 
swallow it.  One, compare what scholars say in other legal systems.  The 
civil law system is not a bad one.  I know several judges believe you 
should not raise it in domestic dispute.  They give a lot more power to 
the judiciary to control and shape the proceedings even to the point of 
examining witnesses. 
I am not suggesting going that far, but I am suggesting that other 
systems exist on this planet.  Consider the fact that courts should not be 
obliged to decide a case in accordance with the wishes of the parties (no 
matter the violence to the orderly and correct evolution of the law).  
What about the belief of the court system as a dispenser of fairness and 
justice?  I know some will say: “Well, fairness and justice is to decide a 
case that is fairly set forth within the framework of the issues presented 
by the parties,” but I do not go along with this—at least not in serious 
criminal proceedings.  Are there other considerations that are ends in and 
of themselves that would counsel hesitation in excusing the waiver?  
Party presentation—how important is that?  We keep hearing that, but 
yet when the court does not want party input or does not care—Erie v. 
Tompkins,22 Marbury v. Madison;23 come immediately to mind—then it 
does not bother them and they pull out the label that this is too important 
to let it go because it relates to subject matter jurisdiction or standing or 
justiciability or something else.  I just cannot buy this hypocrisy.  But 
isn’t the cruel and unusual punishment clause a limitation on the power  
                                                     
 22. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 23. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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of the legislature?  That systemic problem certainly fits in with the other 
categories previously mentioned.   
And then labeling.  I love the labeling.  This goes to subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Well, you know, yeah, it does.  So what else?  I mean, tell 
me more.  Tell me more.  My concern relates to Morton Berger who is 
languishing in prison for two hundred years, perhaps, just perhaps 
because of the failure to pursue a state constitutional claim.24 
I also understand the apprehension of an appearance of impropriety.  
If the court reaches out, it has an ax to grind.  Supposedly it can no 
longer be neutral.  But it’s too late, as far as I’m concerned, to say the 
courts do not take an active part when they want to.  All I have to cite is 
Bush v. Gore.25  That is the only cite I have to give you.  When they want 
to decide, they know what to do and how to do it.  So, it is too late in the 
day to register a principled objection.  The courts indulge in these 
practices already.   
Now, let me then proceed to describe how it might work in practice.  
First of all, the court can bury the issue.  I think they did in Twombly26 
and Iqbal27—certainly Twombly.  The opinion overturned Conley28, a 
fifty-year precedent, they did it.  No one saw it coming.  But in dissent 
Justice Stevens remarks: “This was not raised.  This was not argued.”  So 
when they want to raise something they do it.  Why does the profession 
not get it?  It is anarchy out there!  They raised it themselves! And they 
never gave the parties a chance to brief and argue the point. 
Now there are things that we can do and one of the Justices 
mentioned this.  We can ask the parties to brief it.  That is a good way of 
handling it.  In other words, “I see counselor, a good cruel and unusual 
punishment clause issue, do you want to raise it?”  Well, my wife, Chief 
Justice Rebecca Berch, did it in a previous case.  They asked counsel to 
raise it.  If an advocate does not respond or responds inadequately the 
judge may report that person to the state bar under the Judicial Ethics 
Rules. 
 
Hon. Rebecca White Berch, Chief Justice, Arizona Supreme Court: 
One quick clarification—they didn’t refuse.  They said the language 
was the same as the federal and they said, “We see no principal reason to 
                                                     
 24. See Berger, 134 P.3d at 388. 
 25. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 26. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 27. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 28. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Twombly, 550 U.S. 544. 
KANSAS LAW REVIEW 2010 SYMPOSIUM TRANSCRIPT FINAL 5/14/2011  1:07:31 PM 
2011] STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SYMPOSIUM 923 
think that the Arizona Supreme Court would interpret the Arizona 
provision any differently from the federal.” 
 
Professor Berch: 
You are so correct.  So you can ask the parties to brief the case.  You 
ask amicus to do it.  The judges and their clerks can research the law. I 
think our law school is considering opening a clinic in anticipation of 
being requested by the Arizona Supreme Court to submit amicus briefs 
on state constitutional law issues. 
Now, a word on unintended consequences.  My proposal may have 
an effect on ineffective assistance of counsel claims—to the extent that 
the court may liberally raise the issue sua sponte.  But it is pretty hard to 
argue ineffective assistance of counsel because when was the last time 
ineffective assistance of counsel ever won?  Go back to Strickland.29  It 
is a loser in most cases anyway, so let’s not let it block the path to the 
needed reforms. 
The next unintended consequence may seem purely academic.  What 
is the stare decisis effect of the decision?  You know what that means.  
An opinion affects, that is has precedential consequences for, other 
pending and future disputes.  If the court has not received reasoned 
briefs, it may stray from the true path of the law.  Well, maybe you 
should forge another doctrine.  Let me submit this proposal.  We provide 
that these decisions have lesser precedential value than others.  Some 
courts already have a custom that unexplicated opinions, per curiam 
decisions, and unpublished opinions may fall into this category.  So the 
decisions that are handed down by courts without elaboration from the 
parties have lesser stare decisis consequences than perhaps other 
opinions.  I do not mean to push this point on traditionalists.  I am only 
making a suggestion. 
How should we adopt the liberality principle of excusing waivers of 
state constitutional rights?  Maybe we should do it by rule.  We have 
Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that adopts plain 
error for the lower courts.  So we have that.  Why not for state supreme 
courts?  They have their own rules.  So we can do that.  I would give the 
prosecutor a chance to reply.  I certainly would.  One of my colleagues 
thought that lower courts should be given the chance in the first instance 
to rule on the state issue.  Give it back to them!  Say, “You’ve got twenty 
days.  Tell us your reaction to whether this is cruel and unusual.”  I don’t 
mind that.  I’m not trying to railroad anyone here, but I would basically 
                                                     
 29. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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say that after a sufficient period of time the appellate court should decide 
the case.  Remember as to questions of law the review is de novo.  So I 
fail to see the need for the lower courts to decide the question of law in 
the first instance.  And if there are factual issues in doubt, it is 
questionable whether the waiver will be excused in the first instance. 
Other points to touch upon briefly.  We have fundamental error in 
capital cases.  We have pro se cases where we do a more searching 
review for error.  I would say a lawyer who has proven himself so inept 
in a particular case abandons the client.  Treat the defendant as pro se 
and review the case accordingly, at least with respect to the unraised 
state constitutional issue.  There are reasons not to reach out.  Fairness to 
your adversary—I have already tried to handle that.  Give the adversary 
an opportunity to respond.  Avoidance of constitutional issues—if you 
decide an issue you may make a mistake.  Better to put the person away 
for 200 years?  But that itself may be a gross miscarriage of justice—a 
mistake that has been exponentially compounded.  
Again, I would basically say have a dialogue with the lower court 
and do it.  I really think it would be a healthier system.  I feel better and 
cleaner when I go to sleep that something has been done that is right.  So 
the bottom line is this: tell these parties to brief the issue if it is that 
important. 
 
Chief Justice Berch: 
I learned this morning during the second session that marriage is a 
momentous act of self-determination.  I have been self-determined, I 
guess.  I also learned about mixed marriages.  Ours is one.  We do not 
come from similar backgrounds, and we are not of similar parties.  And 
our poor daughter is an independent. 
As a former teacher of legal method, I am a fan of process.  I think 
that if each of the parties in the system plays its part according to the 
script and does it well, that by and large the right things will happen.  
And that if the system needs changed, the system should be changed in a 
considered way.  Even as we discussed at lunch, we have new 
constitutional conventions and we reconsider fundamental systems.  I am 
not opposed to that, but I am also not yet convinced that this system that 
we have is broken. 
This leads me to some of my concerns with the proposal advanced 
by the very creative guy whose comments preceded mine.  He proposes 
that “state supreme courts should more liberally note sua sponte—and 
decide⎯unraised issues of state constitutional law in serious criminal  
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proceedings when those issues may cast doubt on the conviction or the 





Chief Justice Berch: 
I have a few thoughts, and I hope this does not turn into a session of 
the old show: Can this Marriage Be Saved?  The suggestion just made by 
Professor Berch amounts to a fundamental attack on the adversary 
system as we know it.  We count on the parties to raise claims that they 
deem best, and provided that a defendant is mentally competent, we do 
not interfere.  Thus, in our system, choosing which claims to make and 
which defenses to raise is the prerogative of the party and not of the 
court⎯except, of course, in the federal system, where the federal courts 
retain the right at any time to raise issues that relate to subject matter 
jurisdiction or preliminary issues such as standing, etc. 
By way of full disclosure, I think Michael [Berch] mentioned it, but 
we—appellate courts—may consider unraised state and federal 
constitutional issues in fundamental error review in capital cases.  We 
have capital punishment in Arizona, and we do fundamental error review 
of the record.  So this suggestion is not totally unprecedented, even in 
Arizona.  We do aspects of the kinds of things suggested. 
He also proposes a rather fundamental change in the role of judges.  
Actually being a judge, frankly, is occasionally dull.  So a change in the 
role of judges sounds like it could be fun for a while.  I work on a terrific 
bench.  Some of the people here know my colleagues.  They are very 
smart.  They are very good issue spotters.  Could they spot more issues 
than the criminal defense lawyers have raised in most cases?  I suspect 
they could.  Frankly, my law clerks occasionally come to me and ask, 
“Why didn’t counsel in this case raise this issue?”  These are people just 
out of law school by a few months.  
And they may be right.  I often can’t tell why counsel didn’t raise a 
particular issue, but I have to assume that they considered the unraised 
issue and rejected it for some reason, such as that it undercut what they 
perceived to be a stronger issue or opened the door to examination of 
other issues⎯such as a defendant’s prior criminal history or mental 
health⎯that the defendant would rather not delve into.  Or maybe they 
raised the issue at the trial court level, lost on it, and decided not to seek 
review on that issue. 
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But it changes the role of the judge to try to conceive what issues or 
claims a party might have chosen to bring had it thought of the particular 
issue the judge now mentions.  I wonder if it would turn judges into 
advocates⎯which gets me back to my initial point that allowing or 
requiring courts to raise state constitutional claims for criminal 
defendants fundamentally changes the nature of our adversary system.  
After all, if a judge proposes in a case that the defendant should have 
raised a particular state constitutional issue, doesn’t the judge then have 
to explain and defend that new theory as well?  That makes the judge an 
advocate, not an impartial jurist.   
 Michael [Berch] mentioned Justice Scalia’s position that courts 
should not address issues that not only are not raised but not argued.  He 
disagrees with Justice Scalia⎯on this and other things⎯and suggests 
instead that judges should be permitted, or in serious criminal cases 
required, to raise claims that the parties failed to raise.  It’s a bold stretch 
from the status quo.  The Professor’s suggestion anticipates that the 
courts would come up with constitutional theories for the defense only.  
Now this may perhaps skew the system in favor of the defense.  To 
maintain courts’ valued impartiality, would courts also raise additional 
charges or claims that we think the prosecution should have brought?  I 
have seen a few cases in which I wondered why the state filed the 
particular charges it did.  But we all recoil at the thought that the court 
should be recommending other or additional charges.  But isn’t that the 
fair flipside of what is being suggested here?  Why should courts become 
an advocate for one party but not for the other?  The Professor gives no 
principled reason for courts to advocate for only one party.   
If we are going to brainstorm and have some fun with this 
suggestion, why stop short?  What about raising state constitutional 
claims on behalf of victims?  And why raise only state constitutional 
issues?  Why not raise any state statutory and rule-based claims and 
defenses that the defendant should have raised that may affect the 
conviction or sentence?  Hearsay objections?  Objections to improper 
jury instructions?  If the goal is to provide “justice,” why stop short? 
Should this duty apply for defendants in all criminal cases or only for 
those charged in serious cases?  If only for “serious” cases, how should 
we define serious?  All felonies?  Any crime carrying a sentence longer 
than six-months?  Is that serious enough?   
If the judges are not to advocate for these new theories that the 
judges have raised, must we appoint counsel to represent the defendants 
on these new theories?  If so, where does the money for that come from? 
And why would we limit this new-found obligation to criminal 
cases?  There are many very important civil cases.  We talked about 
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school funding this morning.  And consider health care, prisons, and 
disability issues.  There may be civil cases in which the issues may 
exceed in importance the sentence meted out to one defendant in one 
criminal case.  Should judges advance state constitutional or other claims 
in civil cases if we deem the case sufficiently important?   
As with many proposals, the devil is in the details.  At each step, as 
we face each issue, we must determine where to draw these lines.   
I do like the idea that we could ask the parties to brief state 
constitutional issues raised by the court.  But that opportunity already 
exists, and such requests have been made.  Michael [Berch] mentioned 
one case in which the judges of the Arizona Supreme Court were 
deadlocked two to two (because we were short one member on the 
court).  We asked for re-argument in the case and asked the parties to 
brief the state constitutional law issue.  Defense counsel responded, 
“Arizona’s provision is the same as the federal provision.  We don’t see 
why you would interpret it any differently.”  I was crushed by their 
response.  Since they had failed to make a good argument, should the 
court have made it for them? 
At one point, Michael mentioned that the duty of judges to sua 
sponte raise state constitutional claims finds support in the oath that state 
court judges take to support the constitution and laws of the state.  While 
that is true, I don’t think anyone envisioned that such an oath would 
require judges to raise claims on behalf of the parties.  And remember 
that the same oath requires judges to support the state laws.  So that 
would support my expansion of Michael’s theory to include claims based 
on (mere) state law—as opposed to the state constitution⎯that is, if the 
duty arises from the oath judges take, then the oath would bind judges 
not only to make state constitutional claims but claims based on state law 
as well.  If we are going to ask judges to be advocates for the parties, 
have them be really good advocates and raise all the relevant claims and 
defenses.30 
There may be some problems with doing so.  A few years ago, a case 
came to my court—it was a civil case—and all the way along the parties 
argued it under subsection C of the applicable statute.  We got the case, 
we looked at it, and one justice said, “Wow!  It is a really tough case 
under subsection C.  I really think it falls under subsection D.”  The 
opinion was written under subsection D.  I dissented, and said, “It is 
                                                     
 30.  If the court then fails to raise a state constitutional claim that is identified later—say by the 
circuit court of appeals—may the state court judges be found to have rendered ineffective 
assistance?  Can they be liable for malpractice? 
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really up to the parties to raise their own issues and claims.  This one was 
never raised.  We should not be acting as attorneys for the parties.”  We 
found out later that the parties had not wanted to raise D because there 
were enough votes in the legislature to overturn a case or rule based on 
that subsection.  There had already been a bill introduced to that effect.  
So the parties did not want the case decided on D.  That is why they 
chose to not raise that section, and we messed everything up for them.  
So I think we spawn unintended consequences and problems when we 
take judges out of the role that they are supposed to play. 
Michael [Berch] mentioned [U.S. Supreme Court] Justice Brandeis’s 
wise dictate that courts should avoid deciding constitutional issues unless 
necessary to the disposition of the case.  This new theory certainly cuts 
against this well-established position.   
I was a court of appeals judge before I became an Arizona Supreme 
Court Justice, which provided good training.  It teaches judges not to 
write too broadly because whatever you have written may come back to 
bite you.  Justice Brandeis was a smart judge.  There is much wisdom to 
the position he espoused—that reaching out to decide constitutional 
issues when you do not have to can come back to bite you.  Raising and 
deciding extra issues is also not terribly efficient.  We have learned 
through trial and error that as cases progress through the system and 
issues get raised and discussed and vetted at each level, it is often not till 
the later stages that the theories and arguments really gel.  Every student 
has had this experience in moot court.  By the time they get to their final 
argument, they have the “aha” experience of having it all come together.  
They think, “I wish I had known this the first day.  This is what I should 
have been arguing.”  It is a revelation. 
This also happens to lawyers as they litigate a case through the 
system.  By the time the case arrives at the state supreme court, the 
federal appellate court, or the U.S. Supreme Court, they have their 
arguments crystallized and sharpened.  To have us raise some issue sua 
sponte at the supreme court level creates risks and may jeopardize 
arguments that the parties have decided they wish to focus on.  I fear we 
would not necessarily know what we do not see.   
Do we appoint a state constitutional law counsel?  That’s one 
proposal Michael has made, and, by the way, Arizona State University 
Law School has indicated a willingness to look into this.  I like the idea 
that if we want to ask litigants to address a new state constitutional issue 
at the supreme court level, we might be able to turn it over to scholars as 
good as Paul Bender at Arizona State University Law School who might 
give us some feedback on what our state constitution is supposed to 
mean.  This is a great idea and funding is there.  So I do not want to 
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squelch these kinds of creative ideas.  But I don’t want to embrace these 
ideas without a lot of additional discussion and refinement. 
Just as a party has a right under Faretta31 to defend himself, even if it 
is not a very good idea and even if the case is very serious, the party also 
has a right not to raise certain claims.  Can we force such a self-
represented defendant to raise certain claims that the court has identified?  
Consider that occasionally, in murder trials or child sex abuse cases, 
defendants may not want to go to trial or to present mitigation because 
they do not want to expose the victims or their families to the facts of the 
crimes again.  I think they have the right to make that choice, and we do 
not have the right to say to them that they must present any claims or 
defenses in particular. 
Finally, I will close with that easy out of judges: the ethical rules.  
Whether your state has its own set or follows the ABA model canons of 
judicial conduct, each jurisdiction has rules that provide that, in our 
system, lawyers are the advocates.  The judges are supposed to be 
impartial arbiters of the cases that come before them.  We are supposed 
to be neutral.  We are supposed to be fair.  If we step into that role of 
advocate, fun as it might be, we divert from our role and lose our 
neutrality; we lose that higher moral and ethical ground in deciding the 
case.  We tarnish the appearance of impartiality that helps ensure 
confidence in our judicial system. 
So, as you can see, the theoretical side of me loves this debate.  We 
have great dinnertime conversations over ideas like this.  But the judge 
side of me quakes at such a proposal, at least until it is really fully vetted. 
So that is my response to the proposal to have courts sua sponte raise 
state constitutional law issues in serious criminal cases.  I am sure we 
will continue this particular conversation over many dinners.   
Thank you very much for letting me speak here.  I’ve enjoyed the 
opportunity to think about this bold new idea⎯and to speak out in a 
small attempt to protect the role of the courts and judges in our system. 
 
Professor McAllister: 
Well, I think what I would like to do is invite Judge Sutton or Justice 
Stras to comment and weigh in here.  One of the questions which we 
have struggled with in terms of the case book and getting schools to 
teach state constitutional law is why has state constitutional law typically 
seemed to develop so much more slowly, or sometimes not at all, than 
                                                     
 31. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
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federal constitutional law?  If that is an accurate assessment, why are 
lawyers and state supreme court justices perhaps reluctant—if that is part 




Well, there are so many things you could say about the question of 
why state constitutional law is undeveloped.  I think the lockstep 
problem really has a lot to do with what is going on here, and it might be 
worth giving a defense of lockstep to try to see why the courts are doing 
what they are doing.  I think one defense—though I do not believe in it—
is life’s a lot easier if you are a state supreme court justice and you have 
one analysis and not two.  What judge wants to multiply her work?   
I keep hearing this notion that New Mexico, when it adopted an 
unreasonable search and seizure provision, was modeling it after the U.S. 
Constitutional provision.  There is not a single individual liberty 
guarantee in the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment that was 
modeled after the U.S. Constitution.  All of the individual liberty 
guarantees in Bills of Rights were adopted from—modeled after—state 
provisions. 
Nothing came from the federal government.  Those liberties all came 
from state provisions.  Then when you factor in that the U.S. provision 
applies to 300 million people, fifty states and so forth, it really seems 
strange to think that they should automatically mean the same thing in a 
state with 5 million people.  But the best reason for getting rid of 
lockstep and embracing dual sovereignty is one I think all law students 
should understand by about spring of the first year—and certainly by the 
end of their law school career—and that is the number of constitutional 
issues that have indeterminate, or at least ambiguous, components to 
them. 
It is difficult to maintain that the Equal Protection Clause 
foreordained three tiers of review—strict scrutiny, intermediate, rational 
basis—or that all of the free speech tests are the only ways to think about 
the issue.  The U.S. Supreme Court was doing the best it could do, but 
the oddity to me—from the perspective of American advocates and law 
professors—is why they do not embrace that uncertainty by allowing the 
states to try different approaches.  One way of looking at it is, “Gee,  
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it is very difficult to figure out what the words due process mean.  They 
did their best.  Why shouldn’t we try to do our best?”   
It often is apples to oranges to compare Arizona to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, and that is something I do not understand.  What I think the state 
courts should do is look, as an original matter, at what their provision 
meant.   
 
Hon. David R. Stras, Associate Justice, Minnesota Supreme Court: 
Well, I want to go back to some of the basic comments that I brought 
up in the last panel, and they respond somewhat to Judge Sutton’s issue.  
In the five months I have been on the court, it has not ceased to amaze 
me how uncreative lawyers are about state constitutional issues.  Even 
when they are raised, they are often raised in a footnote or they are raised 
at the very last paragraph after the lawyers have spent ten pages on the 
federal constitutional standard and they said, “Oh, by the way, if we lose 
under the federal constitutional standard, you ought to consider whether 
the state standard should be different,” without giving us any argument. 
Then sometimes I get really interested in something they have said 
because maybe there is some different language in the state constitution, 
and so I will ask them in oral argument, “Well, does this language mean 
anything different?  What’s the significance of this language?”  They are 
very reticent to say much of anything.  It is sort of like, “Well, you know, 
it is kind of like the federal standard,” and they really do not have an 
answer.  For whatever reason, lawyers are just very hesitant.  Maybe it is 
because it is not taught in law schools, but lawyers are very hesitant to go 
down that road, which I think is a shame.  And it probably supports the 
purpose of this conference today, which is to urge folks to look into state 
constitutional law and urge law schools to teach state constitutional law.  
I think that is one of the issues. 
One other reason—I do not think it is laziness or that state judges are 
trying to make their lives easier.  There are a couple of things that I have 
noticed.  One is the judges are hesitant about creating unintended 
consequences, muddying up the law, or creating problems.  A lot of state 
judges want to move incrementally and sometimes that leads to moving 
too incrementally but, nonetheless, that is an issue. 
Also, I think judges want to distinguish state constitutional law for 
principled reasons, the text or the drafting history or the state has a 
different custom.  But in a lot of states—at least the opinions I have 
read—the use of state constitutional law is more reactive.  Judges do not 
like what the U.S. Supreme Court did, and so rather than reading the text 
of the state constitution, they just say, “Well, we don’t like what they 
did, so we are going to impose a more liberal rule.”  So I think that 
KANSAS LAW REVIEW 2010 SYMPOSIUM TRANSCRIPT FINAL 5/14/2011  1:07:31 PM 
932 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 
sometimes judges could be suspicious of one another as to what the 
reasons are for reading a state constitution differently unless you present 
the principled argument.  So all of those may be reasons why state 
constitutional law is moving more slowly than federal constitutional law.  
The premise of the question is exactly right.  I think there is no doubt that 
state constitutional law is moving more slowly. 
 
Professor McAllister: 
Comments from Arizona? 
 
Chief Justice Berch: 
I agree that state constitutional law is developing more slowly [than 
federal constitutional law], for all the reasons that have been suggested.  
Primarily, the lawyers are not raising these issues, and when you 
question them about it, they do not articulate a reason why the analysis 




Can I add one point?  Justice Brennan wrote a landmark law review 
article32 in the Harvard Law Review in 1977, and his basic point was that 
state constitutions should be used to obtain individual liberties results 
that could not be obtained under the Federal Constitution.  
There is one downside to the article: the whole premise of state 
constitutionalism is a results-only one.  Justice Stras’s comment 
resonated with me—that sometimes people think you are just playing a 
game by invoking the state constitution and that is not the way this is 
going to work.  It will not succeed if that is the way people perceive it.  
Whereas, people should say, “Wait a second.  The language is different.  
The history is different.  We are Alaska.  Privacy provisions are going to 
be a little different in Alaska.  Or Utah, where free exercise of religion 
provisions are going to be a little different and mean a little something 
different in Utah from the U.S. Supreme Court.”  It seems to me that 
would be much more effective. 
 
                                                     
 32. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). 
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Professor Berch: 
I think you are right, and it would be much more effective if scholars 
would just assist.  But if that article were addressed—and I think it 
was—to lawyers, all lawyers think about is results and they still do not 
come through.  I mean we are talking about from 1977, almost forty 
years ago, and a lot of others, Hans Linde and others, I think came before 
this one.  So while I agree, the focus should have been different, the 




Let me ask you about that.  Having been a lawyer, although not one 
that typically raises state constitutional questions but usually fends them 
off for the state not wanting a rule different than the federal rule, how do 
you go about interpreting a state constitution?  For the U.S. Constitution 
at this point, you have all the Federalist Papers and you have 200 years 
of case law and lots of different provisions, but my sense is that in many 
states that is not really available for the lawyer or for the justices.  So 
how do you go about interpreting a state constitution and what advice do 
you have?  We have a lot of students in this room.  So now they know to 
look to the state constitution, but how are they actually going to brief an 
issue that gets the state court interested and takes it seriously that this is 
something they should think hard about? 
 
Professor Berch: 
Well, in Arizona it is interesting.  We had some of these provisions 
in 1886, and then in 1910, and we copied them from Washington and 
made minor changes.  So there is a good record.  There really is a good 
record there.  Other states may not have such a record, but at least you 
know from whence it came and you have judicial decisions of these other 
states.  Language—I mean you do not have to read Hart and Sacks to 
know that anytime you have a provision, the first thing to do is look at 
the provision.  I think the text means something. 
Originalism is a 1791 concept when we talk about the Federal Bill of 
Rights.  When you talk about the 1910 Arizona Bill of Rights, it is what 
was done in 1910.  So you have a whole different perspective.  I would 
just plea that anytime you have a statute, you have the same problems of 
construction, you have the same interpretive problems, and you have to 
look at the words and you have to look at the context.  What is the 
history of the times?  Arizona had some labor disputes at the time.  
Maybe that is the reason why we allow people to have guns in defense of 
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themselves.  You have to look at the real history and not just the 




I agree with Professor Berch.  You use the same methodology with 
state and federal constitutional law.  Whatever your methodology is—at 
least I use the same methodology with respect to the Federal Constitution 
as I do with respect to the state constitution.  You may have a little less 
information because you do not have as much evidence of drafting 
history and things like that.  On my first five months on the job, it has 
really struck me how many unresolved federal constitutional issues there 
are.  For example, when does double jeopardy apply in the plea context?  
So you start with a text, but for me it is really about using the same 
methodology.  Now, maybe I am wrong about that and maybe it will 
evolve over time, but the problem has been that some judges have not 
been willing to use the same methodology that they have used with 
respect to the Federal Constitution with respect to their own state 
constitutions and maybe that is a lack of awareness, but I use the same 
methodology. 
 
Chief Justice Berch: 
History and context are lots of fun and are fertile sources of 
information.  The history and context of Arizona’s constitution show that 
it was written in 1910, so post the original Bill of Rights, but pre-
incorporation.  We know that when our founders were drafting the 
Arizona Constitution, they wanted to create some affirmative rights for 
the citizens, and we have a pretty good verbatim record of some of the 
conversations. 
Those conversations provide interesting insight, but there are times 
when the founders simply said, “Here’s what Washington did.  We 
should just do that.”  Everybody says aye and they move on.  So lawyers 
look at what Washington did and get the history of the Washington 
provision.  But we [on the Arizona Supreme Court] are not bound by 
that⎯or by what the Washington courts have said about their parallel 
provision since the time of its passage.  We look at where we were at that 
point in our history and what we think the provision meant to the drafters 
of the Arizona constitution.  And we also look at similar provisions from 
across the nation. 
Who else has similar provisions?  We have found that the ones from 
Washington were also used in Montana, a few of them were used in 
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Texas, a couple seem to have come from Florida.  By the way, our 
constitution is very detailed in some areas, and it gets into things like gun 
rights and private property rights, education rights—including higher 
education rights to tuition as nearly free as possible⎯intimate 
associations, privacy, and other areas.  It is full of affirmative rights.  I 
would encourage all of you to read your state constitution.  It is likely a 
fun document rich in history and probably a fertile source of claims that 
you can bring up on behalf of your clients. 
 
Justice Stras: 
The Minnesota Constitution is interesting because, being an 
agricultural state, we have a ton of agricultural provisions in our 
constitution.  My guess is, and I am not sure about this because I have 
not read the Kansas Constitution lately, but my guess is Kansas has a lot 
of agricultural-type provisions as well.  I do not know if that is true or 
not, but it is very interesting because state constitutions do cover a lot of 
things that are unique to the particular state.  We have a number of 
taxation provisions—which are different from federal provisions—
restricting state authority to tax certain entities like churches and houses 
of worship.  So it is really interesting to see that divergence between the 
state and the Federal Constitution. 
 
Professor Berch: 
Let me ask a question of the Chief Justice if I can, and I do not know 
the answer.  This has nothing to do with my crazy idea.  I am finished 
with that for a while.  When you become an Arizona attorney—and I 
forget because it has been so long ago when I took the oath—you 
obviously take an oath that you have read the rules of professional 
responsibility and you take an oath you will uphold the constitution and 
the laws of the State of Arizona and the Federal Constitution.  Is there 
anything else more specific? 
 
Chief Justice Berch: 
Yes—I hate to answer Michael’s off-the-cuff questions.  Every 
lawyer who takes the Oath of Admission in Arizona also affirms that he 
or she has read the Lawyer’s Creed of Professionalism of the State Bar of 
Arizona.  The oath contains the general provisions to faithfully and 
impartially discharge the duty to adhere to the Constitution of the United 
States and the constitution and laws of the State of Arizona and to follow 
the rules of professional conduct.  But it also references the Lawyer’s 
Creed, which is much more specific. 
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Professor Berch: 
Well, why don’t you have them certify that they have read the 
Constitution of the State of Arizona? 
 
Chief Justice Berch: 
I think I will do it as a matter of judicial education and training. 
 
Professor Berch: 
Maybe they should not practice law unless they have read the 
constitution, because I believe many have not read it. 
 
Chief Justice Berch: 
Maybe they should have read it during their three years of training at 
ASU Law School. 
 
Professor Berch: 
I think you are right on that one. 
 
Judge Sutton: 
I was just going to say one other thing.  I mean the fact that there is 
not much there for a lawyer is not necessarily bad. 
 
Chief Justice Berch: 
It provides a certain freedom. 
 
Judge Sutton: 
Exactly.  There are histories and there are people who have not 
looked at them and that is exciting.  That is an opportunity for the 
lawyer.  Your job at that point is to come up with a pragmatic answer; 
something that wins for your client, that will work for the next case, and 
makes sense.   
 
Professor McAllister: 
To make sure I am clear, would you say there is or is not any 
difference between interpreting the U.S. and the state constitutions, and 
if there are differences, what are they? 
 
Judge Sutton: 
Perhaps elected judges should be more aggressive in interpreting the 
provisions.  There is more room to be practical and pragmatic.   
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Professor Berch: 
One more thing that you might want to think of—and it has been 
some time and you will help me with federal courts—but maybe another 
problem with the state constitution is we do not have the dialogue with 
the federal courts.  We always talk about dialogue when it is diversity, as 
you know.  State law governs, but there is a dialogue with the federal 
courts.  Some time ago in the Pennhurst33 case the Court said that you 
cannot grant injunctive relief against the state official for violating state 
laws, including the state constitution.  I assume they do not get into this 
area at all.  If there is no way that a federal court is going to get into state 
law, even for a damage action because they either abstain or certify the 
question to the state court, then there really is not a dialogue and maybe 
that is a shame.  Maybe it would be better if, once in a while, the federal 
court would look into the state constitution and say it means this.  Then, 




Could we raise it sua sponte? 
 
Professor Berch: 
Oh, come on.  Alright.  That is just another point. 
 
Professor McAllister: 
Well, if you think that state judges either have or, in fact, might be 
more aggressive in interpreting the state constitutions, what are the 
advantages or disadvantages to that more aggressive view—or a robust 
view—of rights under the state constitution?  Is it all on the plus side that 
that is just good for the people of the state or are there downsides to the 
state or state courts?  As we have heard Justice Martin talk about North 
Carolina, many states—Kansas tends to be a lockstep state—there must 
be something that attracts the justices to that kind of an approach.  What 
do you see as the pluses or the negatives of an aggressive versus a 
lockstep approach? 
 
Chief Justice Berch: 
I think Judge Sutton started us off well by talking about the lockstep 
approach and the advantages that it has.  It is easy and it makes training 
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the police officers easy and so forth.  None of that, frankly, really moves 
me.  I think that we have a very specific constitution.  It would be fun to 
interpret it more often.  But the parties have to raise the issues.  We have 
on a couple of occasions asked them to brief such issues, and they have 
not done a very good job.  They have not been very creative about 
saying, “Although this language looks the same [as that in the federal 
constitution], Arizona’s worker’s compensation scheme was motivated 
by the mining industry,” which actually is true in Arizona.  There is a lot 
of history and background.  There are a lot of things that we could do, 
relying on our own constitution, to better protect our own people.  Now, I 
have to say, when you were making your comment that state judges 
should be bolder, I thought you spoke like a true federal judge. 
 
Judge Sutton: 
I know.  It is a very fair point. 
 
Chief Justice Berch: 
On the other hand, until this last election,34 by and large, retention 
elections in the states have almost always resulted in retention of merit 
selected judges, so in some ways, we have had quite a bit of job 
security—though not lifetime tenure.  Even when there were campaigns 
against merit selected and retained judges, they tended to sway the voting 
by only three or four points.  I now think, after recent elections and some 
of the recent elections campaigns, there are going to be more issue-based 
campaigns against merit-selected judges.  I agree with Judge Sutton’s 
point that judges have agreed to adhere to the constitution and laws of 
their state and have a duty to do that.  If they are unwilling to do that, 
then this is not the job for them.  A judge should be willing to give up 
this job and go back into private practice or go back to wherever he or 
she came from. 
In terms of interpreting state constitutions, do I wish that we were 
more active about it and that lawyers were more interested in raising 
such issues?  Yes.  Arizona’s constitution is a fascinating document with 
a great history.  If you take one thing with you from this conference, read 
your state constitution, have some fun, brainstorm it with others in your 
office, call your law professors (they will probably still talk to you on the 
                                                     
 34. In Iowa’s November 2010 retention election, voters threw out three state supreme court 
justices involved in a ruling that would have allowed same-sex marriage in Iowa.  A.G. Sulzberger, 
In Iowa, Voters Oust Judges over Marriage Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, available at 
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phone after you get out of here and have clients).  Talk to them about 
claims that might be raised.  It is a brand new field.  It is fertile.  It is fun.  
Go for it. 
 
Justice Stras: 
To add to the prior point, I think that it is likely that with what 
happened in Iowa with the retention election in light of the principle of 
unintended consequences—the unintended consequence we are likely to 
see is exactly the opposite of what Judge Sutton advocates for, which is, 
when you move out of lockstep, you open yourself up to really vicious 
attacks because then it can look as if you are making up rights.  If federal 
law has not given you these rights, then it looks like the state judges—
even if it is based on a principled ground, some sort of textual hook, the 
drafting history, or whatever it may be—you have opened yourself up to 
attack.  It looks like you are an activist judge even though you may not 
be.  Perhaps we are going to see the exact opposite.  We are going to see 
even slower movement of state constitutional law rather than quicker 
movement, which is very, very unfortunate. 
 
Professor McAllister: 
Does that suggest that Justice Brennan’s article may have created an 
impression, perhaps, that state constitutional law really is not 
constitutional law?  It is just a policy preference that differs from what 
the Supreme Court of the U.S. has said?  Or do we consider state 
constitutional law as truly a coequal form of constitutional law to federal 
constitutional law? 
 
Chief Justice Berch: 
It is one of those Hart and Sacksian types of questions.  That is, it is 
in the eye of the beholder what it means.  One could argue that federal 
constitutional law is not constitutional law either⎯that we are sort of 
making up what these terms mean as we go along.  It all strikes me as 
judicial law because we are trying to figure out what words mean that 
really have no prior definition.  Is it a different kind of interpretation?  I 
am not really sure it is.  I think it is more directed.  I think we have more 
words to work with.  I think we probably have a little more guidance in 
our state constitutions, which tend to be longer [than the federal 
constitution].  In many states, they actually have less guidance 
historically, but more guidance in terms of what the documents 
themselves actually say. 
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Judge Sutton: 
I think some people look at state constitutional law and they say it is 
really not constitutional law because when they think of constitutional 
law they think of the great individual rights cases, and they are all 
countermajoritarian.  Then they learn a little about state constitutional 
law, and they learn that most state constitutions can be amended with a 
fifty-one percent vote.  That does not sound very countermajoritarian.  
The people who interpret the document are elected by a fifty-one percent 
vote.  That does not sound very countermajoritarian.  They do not have 
life tenure.  But some of the most important parts of constitutional law 
are the structural provisions.  In that sense, the U.S. Constitution and 
state constitutions are exactly the same and just as important in terms of 
setting up the structure of government. 
When it comes to the individual liberties guarantees, it may be that 
the U.S. Constitution has a defect and so do the state constitutions.  The 
U.S. Constitution’s defect may be that it is too hard to amend and the 
state constitutions’ defects may be that they are too easy to amend.   
The average American, I suspect, would take the view that when 
they think of a judge that they want on their state supreme court, they 
want someone who every now and then is going to do what the people do 
not want.  They actually think that is what part of judging is—that it is a 
nonmajoritarian job and that they do not think it is good for judges to just 
put their finger in the wind and see which way the winds are blowing and 
then interpret the clause. 
I still think there is that tradition.  It is an area where we benefit from 
the fact that most Americans think of state and federal judges as the 
same, as both doing countermajoritarian work.   
